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INTRODUCTION
Academics, judges, and other commentators complain that, for the past
few decades, the Justices on the Supreme Court have been increasingly
writing opinions that are unreadable for most American citizens.1 Those
critics complain that the opinions are too long and too complex, riddled with
incomprehensible multi-part tests.2 They also attack the style of the opinions
* Walter F. George Professor of Law, Mercer Law School. B.S., J.D. Villanova
University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law. Edward Cochran and Yane
Park provided valuable assistance in collecting, cataloguing, and analyzing the data for this
Article.
1. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Failure to Communicate, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1705
(2012); Michael Serota, Intelligible Justice, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 649 (2012); Jeffrey A. Van
Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial Opinion, Part 1: Back to the Future
from the Roberts Court to Learned Hand – Context and Congruence, 12 BARRY L. REV. 53
(2009).
2. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Missing the “Play of Intelligence,” 36 WM. & MARY L.
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and assert that recent opinions are more likely to be written in a technocratic,
rather than persuasive, style.3
There seems to be little consensus among the critics regarding why the
Justices are writing opinions that are increasingly unreadable. Some attribute
it to the increasing complexity of issues that the Court is considering.4
Others suggest that the shift could be attributable to the lack of trial court
experience among Justices.5 Some also speculate that a greater reliance on
law clerks might be fueling a shift.6
Regardless of the reason for the shift, if such a shift is truly occurring, it
could have important repercussions, depending on how one views the
purposes of the Supreme Court’s opinions and the audiences to whom they
are directed. If, as some academics assert, Supreme Court opinions are
directed, at least in part, toward the public7 and are designed, at least in part,
to advise the public about legal rights and responsibilities and to build public
confidence in the rule of law by demonstrating a rational and transparent
decision-making process,8 then unreadable Supreme Court opinions
undermine those goals. If, however, Supreme Court opinions are simply
directed to the parties before the court, other courts and agencies, lawyers,
and law students,9 the shift is less problematic.
In response to the criticisms, a few academics have conducted empirical
research to determine whether certain opinions of the Supreme Court, and
other courts, are more readable than other opinions.10 The authors of those
studies have also attempted to identify factors that might influence the
REV. 147 (1994); Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985);
Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995).
3. See Farber, supra note 2, at 152; Schauer, supra note 2, at 1455.
4. See Abner Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1359–63 (1988).
5. See Van Detta, supra note 1, at 54.
6. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Meehan Rasch & Matthew P. Bartlett, Opinion Writing and
Opinion Readers, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2009); Mikva, supra note 4, at 1366; Nagel,
supra note 2, at 178; Richard Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1423–25 (1995); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results
of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1383–84 (1995).
7. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1707; Ryan J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking,
Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1027, 1030 (2011); Serota, supra note 1, at 651–52; Ryan Benjamin
Witte, The Judge as Author/The Author as Judge, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 37, 40 (2009).
8. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 5–6; Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at
1706; Serota, supra note 1, at 649–55; Wald, supra note 6, at 1372.
9. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 16; Witte, supra note 7, at 39;
Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1706–08; Mikva, supra note 4, at 1364–65; Serota, supra note
1, at 651; Witte, supra note 7, at 39.
10. See, e.g., Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, Practice Note: Does the
Readability of Your Brief Affect Your Chance of Winning an Appeal?, 12 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 145 (2011); Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1028.
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readability of an opinion, including (1) whether the opinion is a majority or
dissenting opinion; (2) the number of Justices joining the opinion; (3) the
ideology of the Justice authoring the opinion; and (4) the subject matter of
the underlying dispute.11
None of the studies, however, have examined whether the Court’s
opinions have, in general, become less readable over time, as many critics
assert. Consequently, this Article compares the readability of the opinions
issued by the Supreme Court in the 1931, 1932, and 1933 terms to the
opinions issued by the Court in the 2009, 2010, and 2011 terms. Since some
commentators have suggested that the obfuscation of Supreme Court
opinions is related to the increasing complexity of issues that the Court is
addressing, it seemed logical to compare the readability of the Court’s
opinions from the 1930's, at a time before the explosion of federal legislation
and federal administrative programs during the New Deal, to the modern
opinions. In addition to exploring whether the Court’s opinions have become
less readable, this Article also examines whether factors identified in other
studies, such as the opinion type or the subject matter in dispute, correlate to
the readability of the Court’s opinions, either in the 1930's or today, and
whether that has changed over time.
Part I outlines the criticisms that have been leveled at the Supreme
Court’s opinions and some of the possible reasons for the obfuscation of the
opinions. Part II explores the purposes of, and intended audiences for,
Supreme Court opinions and considers whether it really matters whether the
Court’s opinions are readable to the American public. Part III reviews the
other empirical studies that have focused on the readability of judicial
opinions, and describes the Flesch-Kincaid readability analysis that was used
in many of those studies. Finally, Part IV outlines the methodology for, and
findings of, the study that forms the basis for this Article, comparing the
readability of the Court’s opinions in the 1931-1933 terms to the modern
opinions.
I. THE CRITICISMS
In a recent article, Professor Michael Serota lamented that, “while the
[Supreme] Court’s opinions constitute the rule of law, governing a wide
array of both public and private affairs, the average American is likely to find
them utterly incomprehensible.”12 His complaint has been echoed by
numerous judges, journalists, and academics who complain that the Court’s
11. See, e.g., Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7.
12. Serota, supra note 1, at 649; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1705 (lamenting
the Court’s “serious failure in communicating with the American public”).
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opinions are becoming unnecessarily complex and confusing.13 Critics also
complain that the opinions are dull, and are written in the style of complex
legislation or regulation.14 Regarding a passage in the Supreme Court’s
opinion in United States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance
Agents of North America,15 Professor Daniel Farber writes, “[t]he tone of this
passage is unhappily reminiscent of a software manual or the inscrutable
instructions accompanying an IRS tax form.”16
In addition, commentators have directed significant venom at the Court’s
frequent use of multi-part tests.17 Some critics complain that the Court is
improperly legislating when it establishes such tests.18 Others complain that
the tests are misleading, because they suggest that there is a degree of
certainty and uniformity in the law that is not there when courts ultimately
apply the tests.19 Most of the critics agree, though, that the multi-part tests
are generally complex and confusing, contributing significantly to the
obfuscation of the modern Supreme Court opinion.20
Further, critics complain that the Court’s opinions are becoming too
long.21 Indeed, in the 2009 term, the median length of the Court’s majority
opinions and overall opinions were the longest in its history.22 The median
length of the opinions in that term was 8,265 words, compared to about 2,000
words in the 1950s.23 Professor Farber has argued that the increase in length
13. See Serota, supra note 1, at 657–58; see also Van Detta, supra note 1, at 54. Critics
also complain that the opinions provide little guidance for lower courts. See Adam Liptak,
Justices are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1.
14. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1455.
15. 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
16. Farber, supra note 2, at 152.
17. See Farber, supra note 2, at 155; Nagel, supra note 2, at 165; Schauer, supra note 2, at
1456–57.
18. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1457–58. As Schauer suggests, when the Court creates
such tests, it is “not only usurping the power of a majoritarian body, but also taking on a task
better performed by different institutions with different structures.” Id.
19. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1458. As Schauer writes, the identification of multi-part
tests “is designed to suggest (erroneously) that judicial decision making is a largely
mechanical task more determinate and less soaked with policy and political discretion than is
actually the case. By writing in heavily formal prose, . . . courts mask the human element and
the consequent variability in the conclusions they reach.” Id.
20. See Farber, supra note 2, at 155.
21. See Serota, supra note 1, at 657–58; see also Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6,
at 21; Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1713; Mikva, supra note 4, at 1358–63; Schauer, supra
note 2, at 1459–60.
22. See Debra Cassens Weiss, U.S. Supreme Court Sets Record for Longest Opinions Ever,
A.B.A. J. (Nov. 19, 2010, 5:30 AM) http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/u.s._supreme_
court_sets_record_for_longest_opinions_ever/.
23. Id. An increase in the length of the Court’s opinions was described almost two
decades earlier by Professor Frederick Schauer, who noted that the Court had not decreased
the number of pages in the United States Reports devoted to opinions from the mid-1980s
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of the Court’s opinions over the last several decades is caused by “a tendency
to prove laboriously the obvious” and to include “labored explanation of
material that, in the end, turns out to lead nowhere.”24 He is not alone in
criticizing the Court’s predilection to ramble and include superfluous
background material in opinions.25 Another factor that he and others assert
contributes to the increase in the length of opinions is an obsession on the
Court with footnoting and endless string citations.26
Finally, many academics, judges, and journalists criticize the Court for
adopting a technocratic, rather than persuasive, style and tone in its modern
opinions.27 Professor Frederick Schauer describes the modern Supreme
Court opinion as “devoid of anything even remotely resembling literary
style.”28 This criticism is, perhaps, the most distressing because the form of
an opinion is as important as the substance of the opinion if the opinion is
written, at least in part, to inspire and persuade the public, as well as to
communicate rules of law.29 Professor Robert Nagel argues that the
formulaic style adopted by the Court is ill-suited to engage and inspire the
public.30
through the mid-1990s, even though the Court decreased the number of cases that it treated
with full argument and opinion from 150 per year through the mid-1980s to 87 in the 1993
term. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1459–60.
24. Farber, supra note 2, at 154.
25. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 21; Nagel, supra note 2, at 165
(describing the “tireless, detailed debate among the Justices” and the “consistent pattern of
earnest argumentation”). Judge Abner Mikva raises similar concerns, suggesting that “for the
ordinary run of cases, it behooves a judge to begin where his predecessors left off and go on
from that point. . . . Too many long opinions are merely padded for pedantic display.” Mikva,
supra note 4, at 1361. Mikva also complains that opinions frequently “take on issues that are
unnecessary to judgment.” Id. at 1368.
26. See Farber, supra note 2, at 154; see also Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at
41; Mikva, supra note 4, at 1361; Nagel, supra note 2, at 165; Schauer, supra note 2, at 1455.
Judge Mikva advocates for the elimination of footnotes in judicial opinions, writing “[i]f
footnotes were the preferred mode of writing, Darwinian selection would have produced
readers whose eyes are placed on a vertical rather than horizontal plane.” Mikva, supra note
4, at 1367.
27. See Farber, supra note 2, at 147 (describing the opinions as “increasingly arid,
formalistic, and lacking in intellectual value”).
28. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1455.
29. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 170–71. Justice Cardozo, in opinions, asserted that form
and substance are inseparable. Id. at 170. As Professor Nagel points out, though, if judicial
opinions are designed merely to communicate to the public, rather than to inspire or persuade,
“form is important only to the extent that it renders essential information too unclear to be
understood.” Id.
30. Nagel, supra note 2, at 190. Nagel suggests that while the Court, in its opinions, is
obliged to attempt to convince others that its choices are desirable, “persuasion in this sense
requires an unconstrained audience and a responsible speaker, for common volition is
impossible without both.” Id. However, he argues that the formulaic style of modern opinions
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Writing more generally about judicial opinions, and not merely Supreme
Court opinions, Judge Richard Posner has noted that many judges are
disdainful of traditional literary rules of style, so they ignore them, with the
result that they frequently make stylistic “mistakes” that “obscure readability
with no offsetting benefit to any purpose of the writer.”31 Posner has also
drawn attention to a distinction between what he refers to as a “pure” style of
opinion writing, adopted by formalist jurists, and an “impure” style, favored
by pragmatic jurists.32 Posner explains that:
Judicial opinions in the pure style tend to be long for
what they have to say, solemn, highly polished and
artifactual—far removed from the tone of conversation—
impersonal . . . and predictable in the sense of conforming
closely to professional expectations about the structure and
style of a judicial opinion. . . . The standard "pure" opinion
uses technical legal terms without translation into everyday
English, quotes heavily from previous judicial opinions,
includes much detail concerning names, times, and places,
complies scrupulously with whatever are the current
conventions of citation form, avoids any note of levity,
conceals the author's personality, prefers familiar and readymade formulations to novelties, and bows to the current
creates a “specious sense of certainty” and that the formulas in the Court’s opinions are
“frequently impervious to common understanding,” thus constraining the audience. Id. at
192–94. Regarding the formulae adopted by the Court in many opinions, Nagel writes:
Their design suggests that all the relevant issues have been identified,
separated and answered. The doctrine is comprehensive and definitive.
Only one answer can emerge from the machine. . . . A fortiori, the
formulaic style forecloses independent judgment by the wider publics that
are affected by the decisions but that have no special claims to
understanding or authority.
Id. at 195. Nagel is equally pessimistic with regard to the role of the speaker in the formulaic
style:
The tone of the formulaic style . . . is distinctively mechanical. Its
operative metaphor is the observer.
The opinions describe the
performance of contestants, not the judgment of the Court. . . . [T]he
words, once in place, will do the work as the judges watch, recording the
score. The formulaic style strains . . . too hard to convince. By
disqualifying the reader and reducing the judge to observer, it achieves a
false definitness [sic] rather than persuasive power.
Id. at 196–97.
31. See Posner, supra note 6, at 1424.
32. Id. at 1421.
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norms of "political correctness" (corresponding to the
euphemisms for which the Victorians became notorious) at
whatever cost in stilted diction. The familiarity of the pure
style makes it invisible to practitioners of the style and to the
intended audience of lawyers. But it is not at all a plain or
transparent style.33
By contrast, Posner describes the “impure” style as follows:
Impure stylists like to pretend that what they are doing
when they write a judicial opinion is explaining to a
hypothetical audience of laypersons why the case is being
decided in the way that it is. These judges eschew the
"professionalizing" devices of the purist writer—the jargon,
the solemnity, the high sheen, the impersonality, the piled-up
details conveying an attitude of scrupulous exactness, the
fondness for truisms, the unembarrassed repetition of
obvious propositions, the long quotations from previous
cases to demonstrate fidelity to precedent, the euphemisms,
and the exaggerated confidence corresponding to the
declamatory mode of "pure" poetry. . . . [Impure stylists] like
to be conversational, to write as if it were for the ear rather
than for the eye.34
Modern Supreme Court opinions are generally written in the “pure” style
described by Posner. Opinions written by former Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Judge Learned Hand are exemplars of the more personal and
conversational “impure” style.35 Although Posner stresses that few judges
write exclusively in one style36 and that neither style is superior,37 he
acknowledges that the “pure” style is much more accessible to lawyers and
judges than to the public.38 Of the “impure” style, on the other hand, he
writes, “the primary audience . . . consists not of legal insiders but of those
readers, both laypeople and lawyers, who can ‘see through’ the artifice of
judicial pretension.”39 Consequently, most modern Supreme Court opinions
are written in a style that is inaccessible to the public.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1429.
Id. at 1430.
Id. at 1429.
See id. at 1431.
See Posner, supra note 6, at 1428–29.
Id. at 1431.
Id.
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In a recent article, Professor Ryan Witte agreed that “impure” opinions
are much more accessible to the general public, but raised concerns that
labeling the style as “impure” would deter judges from adopting that style.40
Accordingly, he labeled the contrasting styles of opinion writing as
“traditional” and “non-traditional.”41 In his article, Witte advocated the
injection of humor, prose, poetry, or popular culture into judicial opinions.42
However, few Supreme Court opinions incorporate those features.
Although there is a growing consensus that the Supreme Courts opinions
are becoming long, boring, and inaccessible to the general public, there is
less agreement regarding the reasons for the shift. Some commentators
speculate that opinions are becoming more complex because the issues that
the Court is addressing in the opinions are more complex.43 As Judge Abner
Mikva has eloquently noted, “[t]he case of ‘replevin for a cow’ lives on only
in textbooks.”44 Mikva and others also speculate that judges are writing
more complex opinions because they are attempting to write for a broader
variety of audiences in their opinions, including the parties before the court,
other courts, the practicing bar, law students, and the general public.45
Judges are, in essence, trying to make the opinions do too many different
things for too many different people.46 In attempting to do that, critics argue,
40. See Witte, supra note 7, at 40–41. Witte wrote that “[t]he same characteristics that
may render an opinion ‘impure’ are the very characteristics that make decisions
understandable to a broader base of the American public. Branding these easy-to-understand
opinions with the scarlet letter of ‘impurity’ may dissuade judges from utilizing these useful
and important literary tools.” Id. at 41.
41. Id. at 41.
42. Id.
43. See Mikva, supra note 4, at 1359, 1363 (noting the increasingly complex scheme of
statutory and constitutional rights and responsibilities). Because of this complexity, Judge
Mikva argues, “judges must make every effort to focus our analyses, shun theoretical
digressions, avoid unnecessary facts or issues, and streamline the disposition of cases.” Id. at
1363.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1365–66; Nagel, supra note 2, at 177–80; Posner, supra note 6, at 1431–32.
46. See Mikva, supra note 4, at 1366. Judge Mikva writes:
We have taken to addressing unnecessary points raised in parties’
briefs to persuade not only the lawyers and litigants but also the
commentators and the media that we have fully considered the cases. We
have addressed theoretical questions and tangential issues to keep up with
the academic critics. We have explained the facts of our cases and the
ramifications of our judicial decisions in great detail, mindful of our
nonlegal audience. Given the explosion of judicial opinions, however, we
can no longer afford judicial encyclopedists. I do not say we should
ignore our audiences. But I believe that if we subject sprawling decisions
to the scalpel, our audiences will in fact be better served.
Id.

2014

CHANGING DISCOURSE

37

they are serving none of the audiences well.47 Other critics take the opposite
approach and complain that modern Supreme Court opinions are unreadable
for the general public because they are not written for the general public, or
because the Justices are not writing their opinions with any specific audience
in mind.48 Professor Dan Farber writes:
[T]he Justices seemingly grind out written products without
any real consciousness of purpose. . . . If a Justice stopped to
think about what he or she was doing and why, the result
might be to rethink how the opinion was written. . . . The
Court’s failure to write more persuasively is unfortunate for
more than stylistic reasons. We expect the Court not only to
solve legal problems, but to explain why important issues
should be resolved in one way rather than the other.49
Commentators have identified a few other factors that may be
contributing to the increasing complexity of Supreme Court opinions. For
instance, Professor Jeffrey Van Detta suggests that the lack of trial court
experience among modern Justices could play a role in the transformation of
the opinions.50 Van Detta notes that today’s Court is “a far cry from the days
of Justices like John Marshall or Joseph Story, who spent much of each year
acting as federal district court judges while riding throughout their respective
47. See Mikva, supra note 4, at 1364.
48. See Farber, supra note 2, at 153–54; see also Nagel, supra note 2, at 177–80; Posner,
supra note 6, at 1431.
49. Farber, supra note 2, at 157. Farber argues that the opinions are missing “the play of
intelligence.” Id. at 165. He writes:
Good legal writing comes from the head. You must see through and
around your subject, measuring it by more than one measuring stick,
turning it over, testing it, arriving at a just and clear-headed assessment of
its position in the hierarchy of things. . . . [C]areful reading of the Supreme
Court opinions . . . does not suggest that their authors ‘(saw) through and
around (their) subject . . turning it over (and assessing) its position in the
hierarchy of things.’ Rather the Justices seem to have moved along the
line of least resistance to crank out an opinion.
Id. at 166. Farber further argues:
[L]egal writing is addressed to a particular kind of audience. . . . This
audience, whether virtual or actual, is reading with a purpose—not for
enjoyment or personal enlightenment, but to make a specific decision or to
analyze a particular problem. For this audience, and this kind of writing,
the ‘play of intelligence’ is crucial.
Id. at 167–68.
50. See Van Detta, supra note 1, at 54.
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Circuits.”51 Judge Richard Posner offers a more straightforward explanation
for the general complexity of appellate court opinions, noting that it is much
easier to write an opinion in the “pure” style than the “impure” style.52 As he
indicates, “[u]nless one is a particularly gifted writer, it takes much effort to
make an opinion seem effortless.”53 Along similar lines, commentators
attribute a decline in the quality of judicial opinions to the absence of any
editing for the opinions.54 As Professor Robert Leflar wrote, “[i]t is no
wonder that most appellate judges tend to become self-satisfied with their
opinion writing. No one ever tells them that there is something wrong with
it.”55
It should not be surprising that the nature of the Supreme Court’s
opinions has changed over time because the Constitution provides little
direction for the Court, or any other court, regarding the purposes of
opinions, structure of opinions, or even the situations, if any, in which courts
must issue written opinions.56 As Professor Michael Serota notes, “Article
III of the Constitution tasks judges with deciding ‘cases’ and ‘controversies,’
but says nothing about how judges ought to communicate their decisions to
the public.”57 Consequently, judges have broad discretion in choosing the
format and style of writing for opinions, as well as in choosing whether to
write opinions at all. As the number of cases brought at both the trial and
appellate levels has increased, judges are increasingly disposing of cases
without issuing written opinions.58 While the Supreme Court is issuing fewer
51. Id.
52. See Posner, supra note 6, at 1430–31.
53. Id. He adds that “one of the things that law school and legal practice teach . . . is to
forget how one wrote before one became a lawyer.” Id.
54. See Mikva, supra note 4, at 1366.
55. Robert Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
810, 813–19 (1961), reprinted in APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 161 (Robert A. Leflar ed.,
1974). Leflar notes that “[u]nlike ordinary editors or publishers, the state reporters and the
West Publishing Company never refuse to print [a judge’s] opinions.” Id.
56. See Serota, supra note 1, at 651.
57. Id.
58. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 5–7 (describing the practice on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals to resolve a significant number of cases through judgment orders,
memorandum opinions, published per curiam opinions, or unpublished opinions). See also
Wald, supra note 6, at 1373–74 (noting that the majority of federal cases were being decided,
at the time of the article, without a published opinion). Citing Justice Cardozo, Judge Aldisert
suggests that published opinions should be reserved for cases “where a decision one way or
the other, will count for the future, will advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little,
the development of the law.” See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 8 (citation
omitted). Judge Wald, on the other hand, argues that even in an era of increasingly clogged
judicial dockets, courts should dispose of cases without an opinion “only in the clear cut
cases.” Wald, supra note 6, at 1376. However, she notes that, at the time of the article, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disposed of seventy-two percent of criminal
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opinions, that decrease is caused primarily by the Court’s reduction in the
number of cases that it accepts to hear, as opposed to a decision, as in lower
courts, to resolve more disputes that the court hears through unwritten or
unpublished opinions.59
II. THE PURPOSES OF, AND AUDIENCES FOR, SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Since judges have such broad discretion in structuring their opinions, the
style and form of a Supreme Court opinion, or any judicial opinion, can be
influenced to a great extent by the author’s perception of the purposes of the
opinion and the audience for the opinion. Judicial opinions can serve many
different purposes. At the most fundamental level, the opinion resolves the
dispute between the litigants.60 However, commentators identify several
loftier purposes for judicial opinions. First, judicial opinions inform the
public about their rights, responsibilities, and the law that governs their
future private and public transactions.61 In addition to informing the public
about the rule of law, persuasive, well-reasoned and transparent opinions also
foster public confidence in the legitimacy of the judicial branch and the rule
of law.62 Finally, publication of written opinions by courts facilitates
oversight of the courts by judges and the public.63 In short, judicial opinions
appeals without an opinion. Id. at 1374.
59. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1459–60 (noting the decline in cases accepted by the
Supreme Court for argument from over 150 in the 1980s to 87 in the 1993 Supreme Court
Term).
60. See Serota, supra note 1, at 651; see also Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 5;
Patricia M. Wald, A Reply to Judge Posner, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1451, 1453 (1995).
61. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 5–6; Serota, supra note 1, at 655.
62. See Serota, supra note 1, at 649–55 (noting that judges secure the “tacit approval and
obedience of the governed” by providing reasoned justifications for their rulings); Aldisert,
Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 5. The legitimating function is vital since the Justices are
not elected by the public and have few enforcement tools. See Witte, supra note 7, at 38
(noting that the “judiciary’s power comes from its words alone”); see also Owens &
Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1030. In light of the fact that federal judges are not elected, and
are only subject to removal “through a cumbersome impeachment process reserved for
extraordinarily bad behavior,” Judge Wald has remarked that “[j]udges are like family; though
alternatively beloved or resented, the people are bound to us through thick and thin. One of
the few ways we have to justify our power to decide matters important to our fellow citizens is
to explain why we decide as we do.” Wald, supra note 6, at 1372.
63. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 12; Serota, supra note 1, at 655. Judge
Wald writes:
[U]nder a government of laws, ordinary people have a right to expect
that the law will apply to all citizens alike. Optimally, that means that
more than eight hundred federal judges should interpret the same laws in
the same way. Since this will not likely happen by itself, the system
creates devices to improve consistency and correct the judges who err.
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inform the public about the rule of law, promote legitimacy of courts, and
facilitate judicial constraint.64
Just as judicial opinions can serve many purposes, they can also be
directed at many audiences. Indeed, it is difficult to consider the purposes of
opinions without considering the audiences, and vice versa. While the
parties before the Court are most directly affected by the Court’s decisions,65
and are one of the audiences for whom opinions are written,66 they are
certainly not the only audience. So, who are the other audiences for judicial
opinions? Frequently, an opinion is directed at, and provides guidance for,
other courts or other branches of government, including agencies and the
legislature.67 Similarly, judicial opinions provide guidance not only to the
attorneys involved in the instant litigation, but to all other attorneys.68
Commentators have also noted that judicial opinions are a cornerstone of
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s “case method” approach to legal
education, which focuses on learning the law by reading and analyzing
appellate court decisions.69 Thus, law students and academics are additional

Wald, supra note 6, at 1372. Professor Serota elaborates on the constraining function, noting
that “judges who issue poorly reasoned decisions may over time invite ‘limits on jurisdiction,
constitutional amendments, or changes in the way that litigants, the public, or the popular
branches respond’ to their rulings.” See Serota, supra note 1, at 654.
64. See Serota, supra note 1, at 655.
65. Professor Ryan Witte explains that a court’s opinion:
provides the parties with the rationale and legal reasoning behind the
judge’s decision. For most litigants, this is an extremely personal matter.
. . . For those litigants who are lucky enough to actually get a judicial
opinion, as opposed to a simple per curiam order without an opinion, it
serves as the light at the end of a very long tunnel. Regardless of the
outcome, a judicial opinion should provide the parties with satisfying
evidence that the judge has made a thoughtful and thorough decision
based on the merits of the case.
Witte, supra note 7, at 39.
66. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 16; Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at
1706–07; Mikva, supra note 4, at 1364; Serota, supra note 1, at 651.
67. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1707–08 (courts, agencies, and the legislature);
Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 16 (courts and the legislature); Witte, supra note 7,
at 39 (courts); Mikva, supra note 4, at 1364 (courts); Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at
1031 (agencies).
68. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 16; Mikva, supra note 4, at 1364.
69. See Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell: Innovating in Legal Education, 62
CATH. U. L. REV. 643, 646–47 (2013); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in
Historic Perspective, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949, 1973–75 (2012); W. Burlette Carter,
Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997); Steve Sheppard, Casebooks,
Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82
IOWA L. REV. 547, 596–608 (1997); Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern
American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1428–29 (1997).
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audiences for judicial opinions.70 Finally, and perhaps most importantly for
purposes of this Article, judicial opinions are written for the general public.71
In fact, most of the purposes outlined in the preceding paragraph—
communicating the rule of law, promoting the legitimacy of courts, and
facilitating judicial constraint—reflect purposes of opinions that are directed
at the general public.72 Judge Abner Mikva asserts that the increase in the
public audience for judicial opinions coincided with the “statutorification” of
America and the rise of the administrative state in the twentieth century,
when law “entered individuals’ lives to an extent never before imagined.”73
There is, however, no consensus among judges or commentators
regarding which audience is the primary audience for the Supreme Court’s
opinions, or any judicial opinion. Judge Ruggerio Aldisert, for instance,
argues that the audiences for judicial opinions can be divided into a primary
market, consisting of the court, the parties before the court, and the lower
court that issued the decision being reviewed, and a secondary market,
consisting of everyone else.74 An opinion should be drafted, he argues, in a
way that ensures that those persons and institutions in the primary market
understand the opinion.75 Although the secondary market should not be
ignored, Aldisert stresses that “their interests are subordinate to those of
primary market consumers.”76 Professor Michael Serota identifies a similar
split among commentators regarding the preferred audience for judicial
opinions. Instead of describing the split as a split between primary and
secondary markets, though, Serota contrasts a “professional approach” and a
“populist approach” adopted by commentators.77
The “professional
approach” envisions the primary audience for judicial opinions to be the
“legal professionals and government elites,” while the “populist approach”
70. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 16; Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at
1707; Mikva, supra note 4, at 1364–65; Witte, supra note 7, at 39–40.
71. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1707; Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1030;
Serota, supra note 1, at 651–52; Witte, supra note 7, at 40.
72. Of course, many of those purposes are relevant when opinions are written for other
audiences as well. For instance, most of the other audiences have an interest in
communication of the rule of law by courts, and the other branches of government play an
important role in constraining the court.
73. See Mikva, supra note 4, at 1365.
74. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 17–20.
75. Id. at 17. Judge Aldisert suggests that the opinion should be understandable to the “lay
parties” to the lawsuit, rather than the general public as a whole. Id. at 17–18. Thus, it should
be “clear, logical, unambiguous, and free of . . . the lingua franca of the legal profession —
Jabberwocky.” Id. at 18. In addition, though, since the court is another audience, Aldisert
notes that the authors of the opinions must consider “consequence, consistency and
coherence” in drafting opinions. Id.
76. Id. at 19.
77. Serota, supra note 1, at 655.
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envisions the primary audience to be the general public.78 Serota recounts
Justice Hugo Black’s declaration that “people in barber shops, [and] your
momma” should be able to understand the Court’s opinions.79
Serota also notes, though, that it could be difficult to draft opinions that
are accessible to the general public because of the exceedingly low level of
civic literacy among American citizens.80 Since, as he notes, one-third of
Americans cannot name a single branch of government and ninety-eight
percent cannot identify two rights in the Fifth Amendment, “the average
American simply does not possess enough substantive legal knowledge to be
able to comprehend judicial opinions covering the range of complex issues
the Court confronts.”81 Further, he and others argue that most of the general
public does not have the time or inclination to read the Court’s opinions.82
Frequently, the public rely on the media to decipher and translate the law and
the issues of the day for them, rather than reading the primary source
materials.83 American newspapers rarely publish the actual words of the
Court.84
Obviously, the audiences for whom an opinion is written and the
purposes that the opinion is intended to serve will influence the manner in
which judges write the opinion. An opinion that may seem overly complex
and technocratic to the general public may, nevertheless, provide guidance to
agencies, courts, and other professional audiences. To some extent,
78. Id. at 655–56.
79. Id. at 656.
80. Id. at 659–61.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 658; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1707; Schauer, supra note 2, at
1463–64.
83. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1707; Mikva, supra note 4, at 1366. Professor
Robert Nagel notes that the Court’s opinions are “obscured by inattention and by layers of
imprecise reports from newspapers, attorneys, [and] word-of-mouth within bureaucracies.”
Nagel, supra note 2, at 169.
84. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 16; Schauer, supra note 2, at 1464.
Judge Aldisert laments that “[w]hen the media occasionally do report opinions, the courts’
statements are subject to merciless editing or compressed to sixty-second TV or radio sound
bites . . . .” Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 19. Critics also describe the quality of
the media’s reporting on the Court as “shallow and divisive.” Serota, supra note 1, at 655.
Professor Frederick Schauer is less troubled, however. He notes that:
If we believed that unmediated primary legal materials ought to be
part of the public debate, we would behave quite differently in terms of
how we made (or did not make) those materials available. . . . [U]nless
there is to be a dramatic transformation of American public and political
culture, it seems strange to criticize the authors of judicial opinions for not
writing in a style designed to be comprehensible to what is in fact a
virtually nonexistent audience.
Schauer, supra note 2, at 1464–65.
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therefore, the increasing complexity of Supreme Court opinions may be less
problematic if the Court is not writing for the general public. However, if the
critics of the Court are correct that the opinions are becoming increasingly
unreadable, that trend has implications for all of the audiences for those
opinions. While the general public may be the audience that suffers the
most, litigants, courts, agencies, the legislature, law students and academics
also suffer when the Court issues an unreadable opinion.85
A. Impact on the General Public as an Audience
If the Supreme Court directs its opinions, at least in part, at the general
public, and if the opinions are intended to serve informational, legitimating,
and constraining roles, as discussed above, it is vital that the opinions be
comprehensible to the public. As Professor Serota argues:
First, the rule of law function necessitates a broad level
of public comprehension, given that each citizen is bound by
the precedents judicial opinions create. . . . Second, the
democratic legitimacy that reason-giving and justification
confer on judges similarly requires a broad standard of
public accessibility due to the public consent principle that
undergirds persuasion on a societal scale. In other words,
the “consent of the governed” demands persuasion of the
entirety of the governed, rather than of some elite subsection
of it. And finally, a judicial opinion’s function as a
facilitator of public oversight also establishes a concomitant
principle of public comprehension, since the only way
members of the public can scrutinize a judge’s
decisionmaking is if they are able to understand the opinions
that record it.86
Many commentators who view the general public as a target audience for
the Court’s opinions are troubled by the increasing unreadability of the
opinions. Professor Ryan Witte advocates the inclusion of humor, poetry,
and popular culture in judicial opinions and the adoption of a non-traditional
opinion writing style.87 Witte suggests that the approach would make the
85. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 2–3 (stressing the need for a
“serviceable, cogent and elegant end product” for all audiences).
86. Serota, supra note 1, at 656.
87. See Witte, supra note 7, at 48. Witte complains that opinions are generally written “in
such a way as to befuddle and bewilder the layperson.” Id. at 47. He argues that “since ‘style
and substance are intimately connected,’ the opinions that are easiest to understand are often
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decisions more persuasive and more accessible to law students as well as the
general public.88 As an added benefit, Witte argues that “disposing of certain
cases in a humorous way can also act as a deterrent against the filing of
baseless claims.”89
Professor Serota advocates a different approach. Instead of focusing on
encouraging the Court to draft opinions that are more readable, he suggests
that the Court should publish “public opinions,” or simplified translations of
the Court’s opinions, to accompany each opinion.90 He proposes that the
Court create an Office of Public Opinion,91 which would translate the Court’s
opinions into a format that would be accessible to the general public, taking
into account the “low rates of civic literacy and the limited time the average
American has to devote to reading the Court’s work.”92 While recognizing
that such an undertaking would involve significant financial and human
resources, Serota argues that it would have benefits beyond making the
Court’s rulings more accessible, in that it would help reduce negative public
opinions about the judiciary and “lead to a better-informed, more engaged
citizenry and a healthier democracy.”93
It is also possible to view the public as a target audience, but to view the
purposes of judicial opinions more narrowly, focusing simply on the
communication of the rule of law. As Professor Robert Nagel suggests,
written in a manner that grabs the reader’s attention . . . .” Id. at 48. He also argues that
humor demystifies the law, making it and the courts more transparent and thereby increasing
public confidence in both. Id. He recognizes, though, that humor and the other tools of nontraditional opinion writing need to be used in a way that recognizes the decorum of the judicial
system and the relative position of power of a judge over litigants. Id. at 41–45.
88. Id. at 47–48. Witte notes that “[b]ecause law is . . . learned by reading opinion after
opinion, the rare gem that breaks free from formality is more likely to resonate with the
student and be remembered.” Id. at 48.
89. Id. at 49 (arguing that the use of humor to dispose of baseless claims could encourage
attorneys to “think twice before wasting the court’s time”).
90. See Serota, supra note 1, at 650. The public opinion would consist of (1) an
“essentials” section, which explains the essential facts and legal concepts in the opinion in a
straightforward manner; (2) a “background” section, which outlines the factual and procedural
background of the case and a succinct overview of the legal issues “in an engaging narrative
style that highlights the relevant human drama or high stakes involved in the case”; and (3) a
“decision” section, which condenses the essential rationale of the Court’s decision, including
concurrences and dissents, into “an accessible capsule summary expressed as simply as
possible and lacking formalistic hurdles, such as footnotes, citations or legalese . . . .” Id. at
662–63.
91. Id. at 664. Professor Serota envisions an office within the Supreme Court composed of
lawyers, educators, and psychologists. Id. He stresses, though, that the “public opinions”
must be reviewed by the Justices who authored the underlying opinions in order to ensure that
the “public opinion” is a fair and accurate translation of the underlying opinion. Id.
92. Id. at 662.
93. Id. at 669.

2014

CHANGING DISCOURSE

45

it is certainly plausible to believe that only the substance of
judicial opinions matters. . . . [N]o one doubts the profound
importance of the Court’s declaration that racial segregation
in schools and other public arenas is unconstitutional. The
great mass of the public . . . was made to understand this
result. But it is doubtful that the Court’s reasoning, much
less the manner of its presentation, filtered past a few elite
groups.94
Commentators who believe that judicial opinions need only convey the rule
of law to the public are less troubled if the actual opinions are more complex
and inaccessible, as long as the basic rule can be re-stated in a form fit for
Reader’s Digest or U.S.A. Today.
Finally, some commentators assert that the general public should not be,
or at least, is not, an audience for the Court’s opinions, and those
commentators are not concerned about whether the general public can
understand the opinions as long as the opinions are accessible to the other
audiences.95
B. Impact on Other Professional Audiences
If the primary audience for the Supreme Court’s opinions is the
“professional” audience of courts, litigants, agencies, and the practicing bar,
rather than the general public, the opinions need only be accessible to those
groups.96 Professor Robert Nagel defends the formulaic style of modern
Supreme Court opinions as appropriate for those audiences.97 He suggests
that the Court’s primary audience is the Court itself, the clerks, and lower
courts, and he argues that the “complex, layered, and equivocal” or
94. Nagel, supra note 2, at 169.
95. See supra notes 81–84, and accompanying text.
96. While commentators have also suggested that law students and legal academics are
audiences, albeit secondary audiences, for judicial opinions, most commentators do not feel
that the increasing complexity of the opinions will have detrimental effects on law students
because students generally are only reading heavily edited versions of judicial opinions in law
school and schools are adopting a variety of teaching methods beyond the case method to
educate students today. See Mikva, supra note 4, at 1359–60; Schauer, supra note 2, at 1471–
74. Few tears are shed for academics in this debate, as commentators have suggested that the
Court’s opinions are increasingly resembling law review articles, with the same “pattern of
laborious footnoting and detailed argumentation,” “formalized analysis,” and endless analysis.
See Nagel, supra note 2, at 178–80. Thus, one could argue that the opinions are actually
becoming more accessible to academics.
97. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 177–78.
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“bureaucratic” style of the opinions is useful when “used to achieve cohesion
within a profession or control within official hierarchies.”98
Similarly, Professor Frederick Schauer argues that the primary audience
for the Court’s opinions includes other judges and practicing lawyers, rather
than the general public.99 Consequently, he suggests that it is appropriate
that the Court’s opinions, replete with multi-part tests, resemble complex
statutes and regulations more closely than they resemble literary works
because the opinions are being written to serve purposes similar to those
served by statutes and regulations.100 A primary function of the Court’s
opinions, he argues, is to provide guidance, and he notes that “the legal rules
that are easiest to follow are frequently the most complex,” whereas the
“legal rules that are less successful in performing the guidance function are
the ones that are simple and vague.”101
However, other commentators stress that increasingly complex Supreme
Court opinions can raise concerns even if one views the primary audience for
the opinions to be a professional audience. Professor Schauer, for instance,
points out that even if other courts are an audience for the Court’s opinions,
the opinions should promote the legitimacy and constraint functions outlined
above by explaining and justifying the Court’s rationale.102 Thus, the Court’s
opinions must be written in a manner that is sufficiently clear to promote
confidence and respect for the Court’s opinions by lower courts and to
facilitate oversight of the Court.103 Even if the opinions only provide
guidance and do not serve the legitimating and constraining functions,
Professor Ryan Witte argues that judicial opinions must, at a minimum, be
“clear, thoughtful and legally sound.”104 Similarly, Professor Ryan Owens
argues that judicial clarity is essential when a primary audience for the
Court’s opinions is administrative agencies.105 He notes that agencies adopt
major policy changes in response to Supreme Court opinions much more

98. Id.
99. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1465.
100. Id. at 1455–56. Schauer notes that “most of the properties that draw scorn when found
in judicial opinions—complexity, inaccessibility to nonspecialists, and dullness—exist with
far less disapproval when those same properties are present in statutes and regulations.” Id. at
1462.
101. Id. at 1467–68. Schauer argues that the guidance function of opinions is perhaps their
most important function in light of the decreasing number of opinions being issued by the
Supreme Court and other appellate courts. Id. at 1470.
102. Id. at 1465–66.
103. Professor Schauer argues, however, that complex, un-stylistic opinions are not
necessarily “any more likely to fail as a piece of legal reasoning” than opinions that are
“elegant, and simple.” Id. at 1466.
104. See Witte, supra note 7, at 39.
105. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1031.
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frequently when the Court issues clear opinions than when the Court issues
unclear opinions.106
Noted jurists also argue that the Supreme Court must write readable
opinions even if they are writing for a professional audience. Judge
Ruggerio Aldisert, for instance, argues that litigants, lawyers, judges, and
clerks “tend to be very busy” and have “highly selective reading habits,” and
therefore “need and expect to learn quickly what the case is about, what the
key issues and the relevant facts are, what legal precedent governs the
situation and how it applies, and what ultimate conclusion and resulting rule
of law emanates from the case.”107 Judge Abner Mikva is also concerned
that the increasingly complex opinions are not accessible to many practicing
attorneys.108
Consequently, even if one views courts, litigants, and other professionals
as the primary audience for the Court’s opinions and views the general public
as merely a secondary audience (if an audience at all), there can be negative
repercussions caused by the increasing complexity of the Court’s opinions.
III. PREVIOUS READABILITY STUDIES
As critics assailed the Supreme Court’s opinions as increasingly
unreadable, academics conducted empirical research to explore the validity
of those criticisms. Over the past few decades, academics have studied the
complexity of Supreme Court and other judicial opinions, as well as the
complexity of the briefs filed in court and the statutes being reviewed.
Generally, though, those studies have focused on which opinions are more
readable than others and whether various factors influence whether an
opinion is more or less readable. None of the studies examined whether the
opinions issued by the Supreme Court, or any other court, are becoming less
readable over time.
Academics have speculated that several different factors could affect the
readability of a court’s opinion, regardless of whether the court issues the
opinion today or issued the opinion decades ago. Many commentators
suggest that a court’s opinions are likely to become more complex and less
readable as the number of judges joining the opinion increases.109 Coalition
building among many judges with diverse ideological backgrounds will often
necessitate adopting more complex opinions that attempt to address the

106. Id. (citing major policy changes by agencies 95.5% of the time when the Court issued
clear opinions and 3.4% of the time when the Court issued unclear opinions).
107. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 2.
108. See Mikva, supra note 4, at 1360.
109. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1032–33.
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divergent concerns of the judges joining the opinion.110
Similarly,
commentators speculate that judicial opinions will be less readable when the
court is overturning precedent because the court must simultaneously justify
the departure from the prior precedent, despite a stare decisis presumption in
its favor, and the wisdom of the court’s new rule.111 Some commentators
have also speculated that judges with less tenure on the bench may author
less readable opinions.112
On the opposite side, judges and academics alike have speculated that
dissenting opinions are likely to be more readable, in general, than majority
opinions.113 As Judge Patricia Wald notes, “[a] dissent is liberating. No
other judge need agree or even be consulted. . . . It is, of course, possible to
write a calm, moderate, restrained dissent, but the question arises: if the
difference between the majority and dissent is so mild, why write at all?”114
In addition to the above factors, academics have speculated that the
subject matter of the dispute before the court, the complexity (if any) of the
statute being reviewed, the number of issues being reviewed by the court,
and the ideology of the judge authoring the opinion might impact the
readability of an opinion.115
At the outset of each of those studies, as at the outset of this study, the
researchers had to determine an appropriate way to evaluate the complexity
or readability of the materials being evaluated. As Professors Ryan Owens
and Justin Wedeking have outlined, the clarity of judicial opinions could be
measured by focusing on (1) rhetorical clarity – how clearly written an
opinion is; (2) doctrinal clarity – how consistently a court has treated
doctrine over time; or (3) cognitive clarity – how clearly an opinion outlines
the ideas in the opinion.116 Most of the studies discussed in this Article
examined the rhetorical clarity of opinions and other materials, although
Owens and Wedeking examined the cognitive clarity of opinions in their
study.117

110. Id.
111. See id. at 1034–35.
112. Id. at 1037.
113. Id. at 1034; see Wald, supra note 6, at 1413.
114. Wald, supra note 6, at 1413.
115. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1037–38. Owens and Wedeking speculate,
for instance, that the rule of lenity and other rules and norms of society should lead courts to
issue opinions in criminal procedure cases that are more readable than other opinions. Id.
They also speculate that judges writing opinions in cases involving multiple issues “may need
to balance competing claims across issues to justify a holding or to appease varying
constituencies on the Court.” Id.
116. Id. at 1038.
117. See infra Part III.A.
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Several tools are available to evaluate the readability of judicial opinions
or other documents. Linguists, educators, psychologists, and scholars have
analyzed readability of writing using various formulas for almost one
hundred years.118 By the 1980s, there were several hundred readability
formulas and thousands of studies validating those formulas.119 Each of the
formulas calculates “readability” of documents based on different semantic
and syntactic factors, but most focus on word complexity and sentence
length.120 Although formulas that focus on word complexity and sentence
length may not directly assess the content, grammar, or organization of the
documents being evaluated, decades of research have demonstrated that word
complexity and sentence length are the best predictors of readability based on
reading comprehension tests that consider content, grammar, and
organization.121 As Lance Long and William Christensen note, “the addition
of more factors [in a readability formula] does little to increase the accuracy
of readability predictions and renders the formulas much more difficult to
use.”122
One of the most popular readability formulas, the Flesch Reading Ease
formula, was developed in the early twentieth century as a tool to evaluate
the readability of adult reading material, since most of the earlier formulas
were developed to evaluate the readability of primary and secondary school
textbooks and reading material.123 The formula focuses primarily on
counting syllables and words in reading material and produces a readability
score that ranges from 0-100, with higher scores indicating that the material
is more readable.124 A variant of the test, the Flesch-Kincaid (F-K) test, was
originally developed for use by the Navy in evaluating the readability of
technical material, but continues to be widely used today.125 The F-K test
examines factors similar to those examined in the Flesch Reading Ease test,
but the Flesch-Kincaid test calculates the grade level readability of a
document, instead of scoring on a range from 0-100.126 Obviously, higher FK scores indicate that the document is readable to fewer people.
118. See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 148–49.
119. Id. at 149.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (alteration in original).
123. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Readability Studies: How Technocentrism Can Compromise
Research and Legal Determinations, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 147, 153–54 (2007).
124.See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 150. The formula for reading ease (RE) under
the Flesch Reading Ease test is RE = 206.835 − (84.6 × average number of syllables per word)
− (1.015 × average number of words per sentence). Id. at 151.
125. See Sirico, supra note 123, at 159.
126. See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 150–51. The formula for grade level (GL)
using the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level formula is GL = (0.39 × average number of syllables
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Several other popular readability formulas focus on sentence and word
length, including the Simple Measure of Gobbledegook (SMOG) formula
and the Gunning Fog Index.127 Other tests take different approaches. The
Dale-Chall Readability formula, for instance, measures the occurrences of
“difficult” words in a document in combination with sentence length, to
calculate a readability score.128 The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC) software program, by contrast, searches documents for occurrences
of 2300 different words, which are categorized in 70 different “dimensions,”
and draws conclusions regarding the cognitive complexity of the document
based on the frequency of use of words in the various “dimensions.”129
While hundreds of readability formulas have been developed, the Flesch
Reading Ease formula and Flesch-Kincaid formula are probably the most
popular and influential formulas because they are easy to use and have been
tested and validated over decades.130 Further, for many years Microsoft has
incorporated the formulas into its Word software, so that users can easily
analyze the readability of a Word document under either test.131 In addition,
several states have adopted laws that require various legal documents to be
written in plain English, and some specifically require the use of the F-K test
or the Flesch Reading Ease test to measure the readability of the
documents.132
Although they have been broadly adopted, the Flesch tests have also
received some criticism. Some scholars claim that these tests, and most
readability tests, are too simplistic, as readability depends more on the
literacy, motivation, and background of the reader than on word complexity
or sentence length.133 Critics also complain that computerized versions of a
per word) + (11.8 × average number of words per sentence) − 15.59. Id. at 151.
127. See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 150. The SMOG formula measures the
number of words with more than two syllables in a thirty word sample, while the Gunning Fog
Index measures both the average number of words per sentence and the number of words with
more than two syllables in a one hundred word sample. Id.
128. See Sirico, supra note 123, at 162. However, the test requires analysts to subjectively
modify the mathematically-derived reading level based on an analysis of certain features that
might make the text more or less difficult than predicted mathematically, including “(1) the
prior knowledge that the reader would be expected to have, (2) the familiarity of the
vocabulary and the concepts in the text, (3) the overall organization of the text, and (4) the
helpfulness to the reader of headings, questions, illustrations and physical features . . . in the
text.” Id. at 163–64.
129. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1039–40.
130. See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 150–51; Sirico, supra note 123, at 147–48.
131. See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 150–51.
132. Sirico, supra note 123, at 148; see also Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 153.
133. See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 151–52; see also Sirico, supra note 123, at
149. However, as Professor Louis Sirico acknowledges, sophisticated testing that focuses on
the intellectual complexity of documents and syntactical complexity of the writing style in the
documents “can be inefficient and may require subjective judgments before yielding results.”
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formula may not always faithfully execute the formula or may otherwise be
flawed, resulting in different readability scores for the same document
depending on the software used to analyze the document.134 Nevertheless,
supporters of the Flesch tests and similar readability tests stress that they
“correlate well with more sophisticated, content-based measures of reading
comprehension.”135 In addition, several of the flaws associated with the
implementation of the Flesch-Kincaid formula in early versions of Microsoft
Word were addressed in more recent updates to the software.136
Consequently, several of the studies discussed in this Article utilized the
Flesch-Kincaid test to analyze readability.137
A. Owens and Wedeking Study
Ryan Owens and Justin Wedeking conducted the most comprehensive
study of the clarity of Supreme Court opinions.138 Owens and Wedeking
reviewed every opinion and judgment of the Court over a twenty-five year
period from 1983-2007.139 Their study examined 2735 cases and 5799
opinions.140 As noted above, they employed the LIWC software program to
analyze the cognitive complexity of each of the opinions in their database.141
Id. at 149.
134. See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 152; Sirico, supra note 123, at 151–52, 167.
Professor Sirico charges, for instance, that the old versions of Microsoft Word counted
characters in words, rather than syllables, in conducting an F-K Grade Level analysis, and
used an undisclosed algorithm to convert character counts to syllable counts. Id. at 165.
Professor Sirico admits, though, that his charges are based solely on speculation. Id. at 166–
67. Professor Sirico also asserts that because copies of the original F-K study are
“comparatively inaccessible,” it is likely that there are several rules in the F-K test that are not
incorporated into the Microsoft version, such as the appropriateness of counting symbols or
numbers as words, whether a sentence containing a colon is one sentence or two, and the
method for determining the number of syllables in numbers. Id. at 167.
135. See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 150.
136. See Sirico, supra note 123, at 151. Professor Sirico asserted that, in versions of
Microsoft Word prior to Word 2003, the program would identify significantly different F-K
Grade Level scores for a document depending on where the cursor was placed (at the
beginning, middle, or end of the document) at the time of the F-K analysis. Id. In addition,
older versions of Word would not cap F-K Grade Level scores at 12.0. Id. Neither one of
those limitations exist in the most recent version of Word.
137. See, e.g., David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1692 (2010).
138. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7.
139. Id. at 1042.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1039. While the LIWC assesses documents across seventy “dimensions,” Owens
and Wedeking focused on the following ten dimensions, which they determined are directly
connected with cognitive complexity: (1) causation; (2) insight; (3) discrepancy; (4)
inhibition; (5) tentativeness; (6) certainty; (7) inclusiveness; (8) exclusiveness; (9) negations;
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Their objectives in the research were to identify which Justices write the
clearest opinions and to determine the conditions under which Justices write
the clearest opinions.142
Based on their analysis, Owens and Wedeking concluded that Justices
Scalia and Breyer wrote the clearest majority opinions and Justice Ginsburg
wrote the most complex majority opinions.143 They also determined that
those divergences were maintained regardless of the subject matter of the
opinion.144 However, they concluded that all of the Justices wrote their
clearest opinions in cases involving criminal procedure.145 In addition to
those findings, Owens and Wedeking concluded that ideology did not predict
opinion clarity in majority or concurring opinions, as conservative and liberal
Justices were equally likely to author clear opinions.146
Regarding coalition size and opinion types, Owens and Wedeking
determined that Justices generally write clearer dissenting opinions than
majority opinions, and that Justices write clearer opinions as the number of
Justices joining the opinion decreases.147 They concluded that Justices write
the clearest opinions when they are writing for a majority of five or six.148
Unanimous opinions or opinions joined by seven or eight Justices are
generally more complex.149 Owens and Wedeking also concluded that the
Court’s opinions are more complex when the Court is overruling
precedent.150 Interestingly, they did not find that majority or dissenting
opinions were more complex when cases involved multiple issues, nor did
they find that there was any relationship between the political importance of
a case and the complexity of the opinion.151
Owens and Wedeking also addressed the suggestion that more complex
opinions might be simply the result of a “law clerk effect.”152 They sought to
determine, to the extent possible, whether the Justices who wrote the least
clear opinions were more likely to rely on law clerks to author their
and (10) percentage of words containing six or more letters. Id.
142. Id. at 1028.
143. Id. at 1043.
144. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1046.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1044.
147. Id. at 1027.
148. Id. at 1049. In determining majority coalition size, Owens and Wedeking included
Justices who wrote or joined regular concurrences, as opposed to special concurrences, as part
of the majority coalition. Id. at 1042.
149. Id. at 1048–49.
150. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1051–52.
151. Id. at 1053. In order to measure the political importance of the case, Owens and
Wedeking focused on whether the case was reported on the front page of the New York Times.
Id. at 1042.
152. Id. at 1054.
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opinions.153 Relying on research conducted outside of their study, they
determined that: (1) contrary to anecdotal claims, few Justices systematically
rely on law clerks to draft their opinions;154 and (2) those Justices who some
studies suggest may rely on law clerks to draft their opinions did not
generally write more complex opinions than their peers.155
B. Long and Christensen Study
While the Owens and Wedeking study examined the readability of the
Supreme Court’s opinions over a twenty-five year term, Lance Long and
William Christensen conducted a study of the readability of litigants’ briefs,
as well as the opinions of the court in which those briefs were filed.156 Long
and Christensen’s primary goal was to determine whether parties who wrote
more readable briefs were more likely to prevail in their lawsuits, but the
study also examined the readability of the opinions issued in those cases.157
Long and Christensen focused their study on the petitioners’ and
respondents’ briefs in every case in which the Supreme Court issued an
opinion over a three and one half year period between 2006 and 2009, eight
hundred additional randomly selected federal and state appellate briefs, and
the opinions in those cases.158 The database included 648 opinions and 882
briefs from 266 Supreme Court cases, 90 state supreme court cases, and 100
federal appellate cases.159 Long and Christensen used the Flesch Reading
Ease Scale and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Scale to evaluate the
readability of each brief and opinion in the database.160
Regarding the briefs, which was their primary focus, Long and
Christensen determined that most of the briefs were written at about the same
level of readability, and that there was not a statistically significant
relationship between the readability of briefs and success on appeal.161
However, they concluded that the courts’ opinions were generally less
readable than the parties’ briefs.162 Surprisingly, they also determined that
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1054. Numerous judges have described the important role that law clerks may
play in drafting versions of opinions, but stress that the judges are ultimately responsible for
the final version. See Aldisert, Rasch & Bartlett, supra note 6, at 20–21; Mikva, supra note 4,
at 1366; Posner, supra note 6, at 1425; Wald, supra note 6, at 1384.
155. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1054–55.
156. See Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 154–55.
157. Id. at 147.
158. Id. at 147–48.
159. Id. at 155.
160. Id. at 147.
161. Id.
162. Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 147.
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the opinions of dissenting judges or Justices were significantly less readable
than majority opinions.163
C. Law and Zaring Study
Another recent study focused on the readability of statutes, rather than
opinions, and the effect, if any, that the readability of statutes has on the
analysis employed by Supreme Court Justices in the opinions analyzing the
statutes.164 In particular, Law and Zaring explored whether the complexity of
a statute, among other factors, was related to a Justice’s decision to cite
legislative history.165 While their study did not focus on the readability of the
opinions, it provides some insight into the manner in which Justices analyze
complex statutes, from which one might form hypotheses regarding the
complexity of opinions Justices might author to resolve disputes involving
complex statutes.
Law and Zaring identified all of the Supreme Court cases decided from
the 1953 term through the 2006 term that involved statutory interpretation.166
From that collection of 2723 cases, they identified the forty statutes that were
interpreted by the Court in nine or more cases over that time period, and
limited their study to the cases that involved interpretation of any of those
forty statutes.167 Law and Zaring used the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level test to
determine the complexity of each of the forty statutes in their study.168 In
addition to examining whether there was any relationship between the
complexity of a statute and a Justice’s choice to cite legislative history in a
case interpreting that statute, Law and Zaring examined several other factors,
including the age of the statute, the bulk of the statute, the novelty of the
statute, the obscurity of the statute, and the extent to which it was amended,
in order to determine whether there was any statistically significant
relationship between those factors and a Justice’s choice to cite legislative
history.169 Finally, they “collected information on the ideological leanings of
the Justices themselves,” the Court’s decisions, and the “ideological
character of the Congresses that enacted each of the statutes” reviewed in the
study.170

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Law & Zaring, supra note 137.
Id. at 1689.
Id. at 1683.
Id. at 1684.
Id. at 1691–92.
Id. at 1689.
Law & Zaring, supra note 137, at 1695.
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Their findings suggest that Justices cite legislative history when seeking
guidance in interpreting statutes, but also that Justices are motivated by
ideology to cite legislative history.171 Specifically, Law and Zaring
concluded that Justices were significantly more likely to resort to legislative
history when interpreting more complex statutes and were significantly less
likely to resort to legislative history when interpreting statutes that had been
amended numerous times.172 They also found that Justices were far less
likely to cite legislative history in dissenting or concurring opinions than in
majority opinions.173 In addition, they concluded that liberal Justices are
more likely than conservative Justices to cite legislative history, and that “the
fact that a Justice is of the same ideological bent as the legislators who
enacted the statute increases the likelihood that he or she will turn to
legislative history.”174
IV. COMPARING THE OPINIONS OF THE 1931-1933 TERMS AND THE
2009-2011 TERMS
A. Purpose
While the studies outlined above examined which judicial opinions are
more readable than others and whether certain factors might influence
whether an opinion is more or less readable, none of the studies examined
whether, as critics are asserting, the Supreme Court’s opinions are longer and
less readable today than they were in the past. The study that is the subject
of this Article attempts to explore those questions. Since some of the critics
assert that the Court’s opinions are becoming less readable because the issues
that the Court is exploring are increasingly complex, this study compares
recent opinions issued by the Court to opinions issued before the expansion
of federal administrative programs during the New Deal and the
“statutorification” of law. This study explores whether today’s opinions are
longer and less readable than the older opinions and whether the opinions
that the Court issues today regarding administrative law or statutory
interpretation are less readable than other opinions that the Court issues
today. This study also explores the findings of the Owens and Wedeking
study that (1) dissenting opinions are more readable than majority opinions;
and (2) opinions addressing criminal procedure issues are generally the most
readable opinions. This study attempts to verify those findings and

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1658–59.
Id. at 1721–22, 1733.
Id. at 1725, 1732.
Id. at 1659.
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determine whether those patterns have changed over time.175 Finally, this
study compares the number of opinions issued by the Court in recent years to
the number of opinions issued before the expansion of federal administrative
programs during the New Deal and the “statutorification” of law.
B. Methodology
In order to examine those questions, I reviewed each opinion issued by
the Supreme Court during the 1931, 1932, and 1933 terms and the 2009,
2010, and 2011 terms.176 I analyzed majority, plurality, concurring, and
dissenting opinions separately in the study.177 For each opinion, I collected
the following data:178 (1) opinion author; (2) type of opinion (majority,
dissent, etc.); (3) number of Justices joining the opinion; (4) whether the case
involved review of a constitutional question; (5) whether the case involved
statutory interpretation; (6) whether the case involved federal administrative
law;179 (7) whether the case involved a question of criminal law; (8) the
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score for the opinion; and (9) the Flesch
Reading Ease score for the opinion.180
175. However, this study uses the Flesch tests to examine readability, as opposed to the
LIWC test used by Owens and Wedeking. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1039.
176. Admittedly, the selection of the 1931, 1932, and 1933 terms is somewhat arbitrary, as
there is no definitive date that marks the beginning of the modern era of administrative law or
the commencement of the era of the “statutorification” of American law. However, I chose
that time frame because it predates the Supreme Court challenges to most of the “New Deal”
federal regulatory programs, and predates landmark Supreme Court administrative law
decisions like Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
177. I downloaded each of the decisions for those terms from Westlaw in Microsoft Word
format, removed the syllabus and material added by Westlaw, and saved the separate opinions
from each case into separate Microsoft Word documents. This made it possible to use the
readability analysis tool in Microsoft Word’s “Spelling and Grammar” check to calculate the
F-K Grade Level and Flesch Reading Ease scores for each separate opinion.
178. The data for each three-year period was entered into Excel spreadsheets. Stephen M.
Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/
2009-2011 Opinions.pdf (data for the 2009-2011 terms); Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933
Opinions, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933 Opinions.pdf
(data for the 1931-1933 terms).
179. I included cases in this category if the case involved a challenge to a decision made by
a federal agency or if the case involved an interpretation of a federal agency action, regardless
of whether the agency was involved in the case as a party.
180. In addition to the challenges leveled against the Flesch tests mentioned above, critics
have complained that the tests do not provide a precise measure of the readability of material.
See Sirico, supra note 123, at 167–68. While that defect may be problematic when the test is
being used to determine whether a document meets a precise required reading level
established by a statute or regulation, it is not problematic when the test is being used to
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After collecting that information, I reviewed the data to determine: (1)
whether the opinions issued by the Court during the 2009-2011 terms were
more readable than the opinions issued by the Court during the 1931-1933
terms;181 (2) whether the opinions issued during the 2009-2011 terms were
longer than the opinions issued during the 1931-1933 terms;182 (3) which
type of opinions were the most readable during the 2009-2011 terms (i.e.,
those dealing with constitutional questions, statutory interpretation,
administrative law, or criminal law); (4) whether the opinions addressing
constitutional questions, statutory interpretation, administrative law, or
criminal law were less readable during the 2009-2011 terms than during the
1931-1933 terms; (5) which type of opinions are most readable (majority,
dissenting, concurring), during the 2009-2011 terms, during the 1931-1933
terms, and over both time periods; and (6) whether particular Justices wrote
more readable opinions during the 2009-2011 terms and the 1931-1933
terms. Finally, the study compared the number of cases decided, and
opinions issued, during the 2009-2011 terms and the 1931-1933 terms.
C. Findings
1. Readability and Length
A comparison of the Supreme Court’s opinions issued during the 19311933 terms and the 2009-2011 terms confirms that the Court’s opinions are,
indeed, less readable and much longer today than they were three-quarters of
a century ago. Based on the Flesch Reading Ease formula, the opinions
issued during the 2009-2011 terms were, on average, about twenty-five
percent less readable than the 1931-1933 opinions.183 Moreover, the FleschKincaid Grade Level Formula showed that the 2009-2011 opinions were
written at about a grade level higher reading level than the 1931-1933

compare the readability of one document against another, as in this study.
181. I compared the mean and median Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level and Flesch Reading
Ease scores of the opinions issued in the 1931-1933 terms and the 2009-2011 terms.
182. I compared the mean and median page lengths of the opinions, as printed in United
States Reports, issued in the 1931-1933 terms and the 2009-2011 terms. I examined the length
of each opinion separately, and also examined the length for all the opinions issued in each
case the Court decided.
183. The Mean Reading Ease score for all opinions issued during the 1931-1933 terms was
43.85.
Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions by Opinion Type, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933 Opinions By Opinion Type.pdf. The
Mean Reading Ease score for all opinions issued during the 2009-2011 terms was 33.55.
Stephen M. Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions by Opinion Type, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/2009-2011 Opinions By Opinion Type.pdf.
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opinions.184 The average opinion length has more than tripled from about
nine pages for all of the opinions in a case (majority, concurring, and
dissenting) during the 1931-1933 terms to about twenty-eight pages during
the 2009-2011 terms.185 Opinions in cases involving constitutional law were
the longest during the 2009-2011 terms, averaging 35.2 pages, followed by
administrative law (29.7 pages), statutory law (29.4 pages), and criminal law
(27.3 pages).186 While the length of opinions has increased, the number of
cases decided by the Court has significantly decreased. Indeed, during the
2009-2011 terms, the Court issued written opinions in 249 cases compared to
485 cases during the 1931-1933 terms.187

184. The Mean F-K Grade Level for all opinions issued during the 1931-1933 terms was
12.19. See Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions by Opinion Type, supra note 183. The Mean F-K
Grade Level for all opinions issued during the 2009-2011 terms was 13.30. See Johnson,
2009-2011 Opinions by Opinion Type, supra note 183.
185. See Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933 Page Length, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933 Page Length.pdf (mean of 9.26
pages for 1931-1933 opinions); Stephen M. Johnson, 2009-2011 Page Length, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/2009-2011 Page Length.pdf (mean of 27.975 for
2009-2011 opinions). The average length of individual opinions has also increased from 8.2
pages during the 1931-1933 terms to 12.9 pages during the 2009-2011 terms. See Johnson,
1931-1933 Opinions by Opinion Type, supra note 184; Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions by
Opinion Type, supra note 184. The longest opinion during the 1931-1933 terms was a forty
page dissent by Justice Brandeis in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), whereas the longest opinion during the 2009-2011 terms was the
mammoth ninety page concurring/dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
186. Stephen M. Johnson, 2009-2011 Page Length Ad Law, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/2009-2011 Page Length Ad Law.pdf; Stephen
M. Johnson, 2009-2011 Page Length Con Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/
elaw/readability/2009-2011 Page Length Con Law.pdf; Stephen M. Johnson, 2009-2011 Page
Length Crim Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/2009-2011 Page
Length Crim Law.pdf; Stephen M. Johnson, 2009-2011 Page Length Stat Law, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/2009-2011 Page Length Stat Law.pdf. By
contrast, during the 1931-1933 terms, opinions in cases involving constitutional law averaged
11.9 pages, followed by criminal law (11 pages), administrative law (9.6 pages), and statutory
law (8.9 pages). See Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933 Page Length Ad Law, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933 Page Length Ad Law.pdf; Stephen
M. Johnson, 1931-1933 Page Length Con Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/
elaw/readability/1931-1933 Page Length Con Law.pdf; Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933 Page
Length Crim Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933 Page
Length Crim Law.pdf; Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933 Page Length Stat Law, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933 Page Length Stat Law.pdf.
187. Johnson, 1931-1933 Page Length, supra note 185; Johnson, 2009-2011 Page Length,
supra note 185. During the 2009-2011 terms, there were six cases in which the Court issued a
one sentence denial of certiorari, a dismissal on the grounds that certiorari was improvidently
granted, or an affirmance by an equally divided court. I did not include these cases in my
analysis for page length or readability.

2014

CHANGING DISCOURSE

59

2. Nature of the Issues v. Nature of the Court
It does not appear, however, that the decrease in readability or increase in
length of the Court’s opinions is necessarily related to the statutorification of
law or the expansion of federal administrative programs following the New
Deal. Regarding page length, opinions addressing administrative law or
statutory law issued during the 2009-2011 terms were generally about six and
one-half pages shorter than opinions addressing constitutional law, and were
only about two pages longer than opinions addressing criminal law.188 Thus,
while there has been a tremendous increase in the average page length of all
opinions since the 1930s, opinions involving administrative law or statutory
law are not significantly outpacing their competitors.
Regarding readability, one might infer that a reduction in readability is
related to the statutorification of law or expansion of federal administrative
programs if (1) the Court’s opinions that address statutory law or
administrative law issues are less readable than other opinions; and (2) the
percentage of opinions issued by the Court in those areas increased since the
1930s.
Based on the F-K Grade Level Formula, administrative law opinions
issued during the 2009-2011 terms were the most difficult to read, followed
by statutory law opinions, constitutional law opinions, and finally criminal
law opinions.189 However, the difference between the average reading level
of the administrative law opinions and the criminal law opinions (the most
readable during that time frame), was only about one-quarter of a grade.190
The difference between the average reading level of statutory law opinions
and criminal law opinions was even smaller.191 By contrast, during the 19311933 terms, the administrative law opinions were the most difficult to read,
188. See supra note 186.
189. The mean F-K Grade Level for administrative law opinions was 13.496. Stephen M.
Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions Ad Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/
readability/2009-2011 Opinions Ad Law.pdf. The mean F-K Grade Level for statutory law
opinions was 13.396. Stephen M. Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions Stat Law, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/2009-2011 Opinions Stat Law.pdf. The mean FK Grade Level for constitutional law opinions was 13.35. Stephen M. Johnson, 2009-2011
Opinions Con Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/2009-2011
Opinions Con Law.pdf. The mean F-K Grade Level for criminal law opinions was 13.24.
Stephen M. Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions Crim Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.
edu/elaw/readability/2009-2011 Opinions Crim Law.pdf.
190. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions Ad Law, supra note 189; Johnson, 2009-2011
Opinions Crim Law, supra note 189 (identifying a difference of 0.256 between F-K Grade
Level for criminal law opinions and administrative law opinions).
191. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions Crim Law, supra note 189; Johnson, 2009-2011
Opinions Stat Law, supra note 189 (identifying a difference of 0.156 between F-K Grade
Level for criminal law opinions and statutory law opinions).
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followed again by statutory law opinions, constitutional law opinions, and
criminal law opinions.192 However, the difference between the average
reading level of the administrative law opinions and the criminal law
opinions (the most readable during that time frame), was more than a
grade.193 The difference between the average reading level of the statutory
law opinions and criminal law opinions was also about one grade level
during that time frame.194 Thus, the readability gap between administrative
law and statutory law opinions and other types of opinions appears to have
narrowed significantly between the 1930s and today.
Even if there were a greater difference between the readability of
administrative law and statutory law opinions and other types of opinions
today, that would not necessarily suggest that the statutorification of law or
the expansion of federal administrative programs is to blame for the decrease
in readability of Supreme Court opinions, since the Court has not
significantly increased the percentage of administrative or statutory law cases
that it decides. Of the opinions issued during the 2009-2011 terms, sixty
percent addressed statutory law issues and twenty-five percent addressed
administrative law issues,195 while fifty-five percent of the opinions issued
during the 1931-1933 terms addressed statutory law issues and thirty-three
percent addressed administrative law issues.196 Thus, while there has been an
increase in the percentage of cases addressing statutory law issues, it has
been a small increase and there has been a fairly significant decrease in the
percentage of cases addressing administrative law issues.
It is interesting to note, though, that the percentage of cases addressing
criminal law issues increased from eight percent during the 1931-1933 terms
192. The mean F-K Grade Level for administrative law opinions was 12.62. Stephen M.
Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions Ad Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/
readability/1931-1933 Opinions Ad Law.pdf. The mean F-K Grade Level for statutory law
opinions was 12.44. Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions Stat Law, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933 Opinions Stat Law.pdf. The mean FK Grade Level for constitutional law opinions was 12.34. Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933
Opinions Con Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933
Opinions Con Law.pdf. The mean F-K Grade Level for criminal law opinions was 11.49.
Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions Crim Law, available at http://www2.law.mercer.
edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933 Opinions Crim Law.pdf.
193. See Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions Ad Law, supra note 192; Johnson, 1931-1933
Opinions Crim Law, supra note 192 (identifying a difference of 1.13 between F-K Grade
Level for criminal law opinions and administrative law opinions).
194. See Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions Stat Law, supra note 192; Johnson, 1931-1933
Opinions Crim Law, supra note 192 (identifying a difference of 0.95 between F-K Grade
Level for criminal law opinions and statutory law opinions).
195. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Page Length Ad Law, supra note 186 (25.3%); Johnson,
2009-2011 Page Length Stat Law, supra note 186 (60.2%).
196. See Johnson, 1931-1933 Page Length Ad Law, supra note 186 (33.2%); Johnson,
1931-1933 Page Length Stat Law, supra note 186 (55.1%).

2014

CHANGING DISCOURSE

61

to forty-one percent during the 2009-2011 terms.197 Significantly, too, the
average reading level for criminal law opinions issued during the 2009-2011
terms is one and three-quarters grade levels higher than the reading level for
criminal law opinions issued during the 1931-1933 terms.198 The change in
the average reading level for criminal law opinions between the 1930s and
today exceeded the changes for administrative law, statutory law, and
constitutional law, each of which were about a grade level.199 While the
Court’s criminal law opinions are still the most readable of the types of
opinions examined in this study, they have become increasingly less readable
than they were during the 1930s, and constitute a much greater percentage of
the Court’s opinions today than they did during the 1930s.
While the data in this study does not support an inference that the
statutorification of law or the expansion of federal administrative programs
has contributed to a decrease in the readability of the Supreme Court’s
opinions or an increase in the length of the opinions, it is clear that, at some
point after the 1931-1933 terms, there was a shift in the manner in which the
Justices on the Supreme Court reach consensus and express their views on
cases. Whereas the Justices in the 1930s frequently reached consensus on
opinions or refrained from issuing separate written dissenting or concurring
opinions, today’s Justices are much more willing to engage in academic
debate and dialogue through dissenting and concurring opinions. While
academics disagree regarding what factors motivated that change, the nature
of that debate and dialogue in the dueling opinions necessarily leads to
longer and less readable opinions, as the Justices seemingly feel compelled to
respond to each point raised in the separate opinions.
In almost ninety percent of the cases decided during the 1931-1933
terms, the Court issued a single written opinion.200 In many of those cases, if
Justices concurred or dissented, the opinion of the Court merely indicated the
197. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Page Length Crim Law, supra note 186 (40.96%); Johnson,
1931-1933 Page Length Crim Law, supra note 186 (8.45%).
198. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions Crim Law, supra note 189; Johnson, 1931-1933
Opinions Crim Law, supra note 192 (identifying a difference of 1.75 between F-K Grade
Level for criminal law opinions in the 1931-1933 terms and criminal law opinions in the 20092011 terms).
199. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions Ad Law, supra note 189; Johnson, 1931-1933
Opinions Ad Law, supra note 192 (identifying a different of 0.876 between F-K Grade Level
for administrative law opinions in the 1931-1933 terms and 2009-2011 terms); Johnson,
2009-2011 Opinions Stat Law, supra note 189; Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions Stat Law, supra
note 192 (identifying a difference of 0.956 between F-K Grade Level for statutory law
opinions in the 1931-1933 terms and 2009-2011 terms); Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions Con
Law, supra note 189; Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions Con Law, supra note 192 (identifying a
difference of 1.01 between F-K Grade Level for constitutional law opinions in the 1931-1933
terms and 2009-2011 terms).
200. See Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions, supra note 178.
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concurrence or dissent of those Justices, without providing any explanation
for the Justices’ disagreement with the majority opinion.201 In other cases,
the Court’s opinion included one or two sentences explaining the concurring
or dissenting views of Justices who departed from the majority opinion.202
Only ten percent of the separate written opinions issued by the Court during
the 1931-1933 terms were dissenting opinions and only two percent were
concurring opinions.203 By contrast, during the 2009-2011 terms, the Court
issued a single written opinion in only about twenty percent of all of the
cases decided.204 Only forty-three percent of the separate written opinions
issued by the Court during that period were majority opinions.205 Almost
thirty percent of the opinions were concurring opinions and about twentyfive percent of the opinions were dissenting opinions.206
Academics have traced the shift in the Court’s opinion delivery process
to the 1940s.207 While the percentage of the Court’s cases decided
unanimously held relatively steady at eighty to ninety percent from the
beginning of the Marshall Court through the 1930s, the percentage of cases
decided by a non-unanimous Court exploded in 1941 and peaked in 1947,
when only fourteen percent of the Court’s cases were decided
unanimously.208 Similarly, while majority opinions made up eighty to ninety
201. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443 (1934) (Cardozo, J., and Stone, J.,
dissenting without opinion); Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286 (1934) (Stone, J., concurring
without opinion); Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 638 (1934) (Butler, J., McReynolds, J.,
Sutherland, J., and Van Devanter, J., concurring without opinion). This practice was not
unusual at the time, although concurrences without explanation were sometimes considered
insulting to the majority opinion author. Louis Lusky, Fragmentation of the Supreme Court:
An Inquiry Into Causes, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1982).
202. See, e.g., Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933) (one sentence describing the basis for
Justice Butler’s dissent); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) (one sentence
describing the dissenting opinions of Justices Sutherland and Butler).
203. See Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions by Opinion Type, supra note 184.
204. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions, supra note 178 (finding that a single opinion was
issued in only 21.29% of the cases). The Court issued 564 separate written opinions for the
249 cases that it decided during the 2009-2011 terms, as compared to the 554 separate written
opinions that it issued for the 485 cases that it decided during the 1931-1933 terms. Id.; see
also Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions, supra note 178.
205. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions By Opinion Type, supra note 184 (43.26%).
206. Id. The precise percentages vary depending on whether opinions that concur or dissent
in part are included with concurring or dissenting opinions. Concurring opinions, including
concurring and dissenting opinions, made up 31.38% of the opinions issued during the 20092011 terms, while concurring opinions, excluding concurring and dissenting opinions, made
up 28.01%. Similarly, dissenting opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions,
made up 27.84% of the opinions issued during the 2009-2011 terms, while dissenting
opinions, excluding concurring and dissenting opinions, made up 24.47%. Id.
207. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court
1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 137, 175–79 (1999).
208. Id. at 175.
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percent of the Court’s opinions from the time of the Marshall Court through
the 1930s, the percentage of dissenting and concurring opinions almost
doubled in 1941 and the number of dissents and concurrences exceeded the
number of majority opinions beginning in 1948.209 Perhaps the most
dramatic increase during the time period was the increase in concurring
opinions. The Court issued only 1 concurring opinion for the 149 majority
opinions that it issued during the 1936 but issued 42 concurring opinions for
the 136 majority opinions that it issued during the 1945 term.210
Professor Louis Lusky, who served as a law clerk to Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone during the 1937 term, attributes the fragmentation of the Court to (1) a
landmark concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Graves v. New York
ex rel. O’Keefe,211 in which Justice Frankfurter advocated returning to the
Supreme Court’s pre-1800 “healthy practice whereby the Justices gave
expression to individual opinions,”212 and (2) a trend in the Court, at the time,
away from a textualist interpretation of the Constitution, leading Justices to
advocate for more innovative interpretations of the Constitution.213 Lusky
argues that both of these factors sparked an increase in the willingness of
Justices to author their own separate opinions.214 Some scholars, though,
attribute the fragmentation of the Court to ineffective leadership of the Court
by Justice Stone and to Stone’s articulated belief that “imposed unanimity
was no virtue in developing the law.”215 Other scholars suggest that the
fragmentation of the Court exploded in the 1940s because the Judiciary Act
of 1925 gave the Justices greater control over their docket, so that
“developing and articulating a coherent judicial philosophy perhaps took on a
greater significance for individual Justices after the Act.”216
Regardless of the reasons for the shift, a comparison of the opinions
issued during the 1931-1933 terms and the 2009-2011 terms vividly
demonstrates the shift. In the format adopted beginning in the 1940s, the
Justices are speaking to each other and debating more than they are outlining
a rule of law for the public. Their primary audience is more likely an
academic or “professional” audience, rather than the public. That may not be
surprising in light of the fact that more than half of the Justices appointed to
the Supreme Court since 1939, including eight of the sitting Justices, had
209. Id. at 177–78.
210. See Lusky, supra note 201, at 1138, Table I.
211. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
212. Id. at 487 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
213. See Lusky, supra note 201, at 1143–47.
214. Id.
215. See Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the
United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 379–84 (1988).
216. See Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Disunity, The Judges’ Bill
and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 W. POL. Q. 471, 482–83 (1977).
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some law school teaching experience prior to their appointment.217 It should
also not be surprising, therefore, that opinions written for an academic or
professional audience in the style of a debate or academic dialogue are
longer, more complex, and less readable.
3. Readability of Opinions by Opinion Type and Justice
As noted above, the Owens and Wedeking, and Long and Christensen
studies reached conflicting conclusions regarding the types of opinions that
were the most readable, with Owens and Wedeking concluding that
dissenting opinions are clearer than majority opinions, and Long and
Christensen concluding that majority opinions are more readable than
dissenting opinions.218 In light of the small number of concurring and
dissenting opinions issued during the 1931-1933 terms, it is difficult to draw
comparisons between the readability of opinions by opinion type for the time
periods covered by this study. Nevertheless, during the 1931-1933 terms,
concurring opinions were the most readable, averaging an F-K grade level of
10.85, followed by dissenting opinions (11.3), and majority opinions
(12.33).219 During the 2009-2011 terms, concurring opinions were again the
most readable, averaging 12.9, followed by majority opinions (13.44) and
dissenting opinions (13.49).220 Thus, for the opinions examined in this study,
concurring opinions were the most readable. Dissenting opinions were more
readable than majority opinions during the 1931-1933 terms, but slightly less
readable during the 2009-2011 terms. Concurring opinions were also the
shortest type of opinion, averaging about four pages during the 1931-1933
terms (compared to eight-page majority opinions and nine-page dissents)221

217. This assertion is based on an analysis of the data in the United States Supreme Court
Justices Database. See Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott Hendrickson &
Jason Roberts, The U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database (March 2, 2013),
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/justicedata.html. Eighteen of the thirty-five Justices appointed
since 1939 had prior law teaching experience. Id. All of the sitting Justices, other than Justice
Thomas, had law school teaching experience prior to their nomination to the Court. Id. By
contrast, only twelve of the seventy-nine Justices (fifteen percent) appointed to the Court prior
to 1939 had prior law teaching experience. Id.
218. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1047; Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at
160. As noted above, Owens and Wedeking used the LIWC formula to analyze the opinions,
while Long and Christensen used the F-K formulas. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at
1039; Long & Christensen, supra note 10, at 148.
219. See Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions By Opinion Type, supra note 183.
220. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions By Opinion Type, supra note 183.
221. See Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions By Opinion Type, supra note 183 (finding a mean
page length of 3.8 pages for concurring opinions, 8.18 pages for majority opinions, and 9.33
pages for dissenting opinions).
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and about six pages during the 2009-2011 terms (compared to seventeenpage majority opinions and fifteen-page dissents).222
Owens and Wedeking’s study also examined the clarity of the Court’s
opinions by individual Justice and determined that Justices Scalia and Breyer
wrote the clearest majority opinions, while Justice Ginsburg wrote the most
complex majority opinions.223 Based on an analysis of a more limited
universe of opinions than the Owens and Wedeking study, and utilizing the
F-K readability formulas rather than the LIWC formulas used by Owens and
Wedeking, this study found that Justices Kagan (12.64 F-K score) and
Roberts (13.13 F-K score) wrote the most readable majority opinions, and
most readable opinions generally, during the 2009-2011 terms, while Justices
Stevens (14.1 F-K score) and Sotomayor (14.27 F-K score) wrote the least
readable majority opinions and least readable opinions generally, although
the most readable and least readable were separated by only about a grade
and a half in reading levels according to the F-K Grade Level Formula.224 By
contrast, during the 1931-1933 terms, Justices Cardozo (11.36 F-K score)
and Brandeis (11.49 F-K score) wrote the most readable opinions, while
Justices Hughes (12.64 F-K score) and Stone (13.18 F-K score) wrote the
least readable opinions.225 Justice Holmes’ opinions during that time period
were even more readable by almost two grade levels (9.64 F-K score), but he
only authored seven opinions.226
222. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions By Opinion Type, supra note 183 (finding a mean
page length of 5.54 pages for concurring opinions without concurring/dissenting opinions, 6.5
pages for concurring opinions with concurring/dissenting opinions included, 16.5 pages for
majority opinions, 14.58 pages for dissenting opinions without concurring/dissenting opinions,
and 14.57 pages for dissenting opinions with concurring/dissenting opinions included).
223. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 7, at 1044.
224. See Stephen M. Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions By Justice, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/2009-2011 Opinions By Justice.pdf. Although
the data suggest that Justice Kagan’s opinions were the most readable opinions based on the FK Grade Level scores, it is worth nothing tht she only authored twenty opinions during the
2009-2011 time frame due to her more recent appointment to the Court. Id. The F-K scores
for the other Justices were: Breyer (13.30); Kennedy (13.33); Ginsburg (13.53); Scalia
(13.89); Thomas (13.96); and Alito (13.97). While Justice Kagan’s opinions were the most
readable, they were also, on average, the longest at 17.75 pages. Id. The average page length
of the opinions of the other Justices were: Stevens (16.66 pages); Kennedy (15.35 pages);
Sotomayor (14.5 pages); Alito (13.18 pages); Ginsburg (12.9 pages); Breyer (12.42 pages);
Thomas (10.98 pages); and Scalia (10.5 pages). Id.
225. See Stephen M. Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions By Justice, available at
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/elaw/readability/1931-1933 Opinions By Justice.pdf. Justice
Van Devanter’s opinions were less readable, by F-K Grade Level score (12.88), than any
Justice other than Justice Stone, but he only authored twelve opinions during the 1931-1933
Supreme Court terms. Id.
226. Id. Justice Holmes’ opinions during the 1931-1933 Supreme Court terms were also the
shortest, averaging 2.43 pages each. Id. Justices Van Devanter (11.83 pages) and Brandeis
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Thus, most of the Justices writing during the 1931-1933 terms were
writing opinions that could be understood by persons with a high school
education (F-K of 12 or less), while most of the Justices writing during the
2009-2011 terms were writing opinions that are targeted to persons with at
least some college education.227 The most readable opinion authored during
the 1931-1933 terms, Justice Brandeis’ majority opinion in Van Huffel v.
Harkelrode,228 was written at a level (8.3) that could be understood by
someone with little more than a grade school education,229 while the most
readable opinion authored during the 2009-2011 terms, Justice Roberts’
majority opinion in Blueford v. Arkansas,230 was written at a level (11.0)
appropriate for a junior in high school.231
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the opinions issued by the Supreme Court in the 19311933 terms and the 2009-2011 terms confirms the claims of critics that the
Court’s decisions are becoming excessively long and unreadable for the
public. Today’s opinions are three times as long as the Depression era
opinions and are twenty-five percent less readable, based on the Flesch
Reading Ease formula.232 However, the transition does not appear to be
related to increasing legal challenges spurred by the “statutorification” of law
or the expansion of federal administrative programs following the New
Deal.233 Indeed, the Court’s opinions are getting longer and less readable in
all types of cases, with the greatest increase in obfuscation arising in cases
involving criminal law.234 It appears more likely that a cultural change in the
Court, the expansion of concurring and dissenting opinions in the 1940s,
could have played an important role in changing the nature of the dialogue in
the Court’s opinions, sparking a more academic and professional tone in the
(10.28 pages) averaged the longest opinions during that time frame. Id.
227. While the Court’s opinions are written on a higher level today, based on the F-K
formulae, than they were in the 1930s, the percentage of the American population twenty-five
years and older who completed high school in 1940 was about twenty-five percent, compared
to more than eighty percent in 2009. See U.S. Census Bureau, Educational Attainment in the
United States: 2009 (Feb. 2012) at 3, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p20566.pdf. Similarly, the percentage of the American population twenty-five years and older
who completed college has grown from less than five percentin 1940 to about thirty percent in
2009. Id.
228. 284 U.S. 225 (1931).
229. See Johnson, 1931-1933 Opinions, supra note 178.
230. 132 S. Ct. 2044 (2012).
231. See Johnson, 2009-2011 Opinions, supra note 178.
232. See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 188–96 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
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opinions.235 Regardless of what factors motivated the shift, the Court’s
opinions today are less likely to achieve the goals identified for them by
many commentators: (1) informing the public about the rule of law; (2)
promoting the legitimacy of courts; and (3) facilitating judicial constraint.236
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has proposed several reforms of Supreme
Court practice and procedure that would help meet those goals.237 Like
Professor Serota, Dean Chemerinsky suggests that the Court’s opinions
should be accompanied by a short, succinct, non-precedential summary of
the opinion.238 The summary proposed by Chemerinsky would be much
shorter than the “public opinions” proposed by Serota, and would be written
by the Justices, rather than a new administrative office, as proposed by
Serota.239 Like other reformers, Chemerinsky also proposes word and page
limits for the Court’s opinions.240 Chemerinsky’s other reform proposals do
not directly address the format of the Court’s opinions, but are targeted at
improving communication between the Court and the public and promoting
the informing, legitimizing, and constraining goals outlined above.
Specifically, he proposes that the Court broadcast oral arguments and other
proceedings.241
Such broadcasts, he argues, would help the public
understand the issues before the Court, understand the judicial process, and
understand the Court.242 Further, he proposes that the Court should spread
out the release of opinions at the end of the term and announce, in advance,
which opinions will be released on a particular day.243 Since the public relies
heavily on the media to translate the Court’s opinions for them and outline
the implications of the opinions, Chemerinsky argues that his reform
proposals will make it easier for the media to research and report the
opinions accurately.244
Although the proposals to impose page or word limits on the Court’s
opinions and to broadcast the Court’s proceedings are likely to face
opposition from the Court, the others are fairly modest. At a time when the
235. See supra notes 200–16 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
237. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1716.
238. Id. at 1712.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1716.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1709–10. Chemerinsky notes that most Americans, without the ability to watch
the Supreme Court’s arguments, thought that the central issue before the Court in the case
challenging the Affordable Care Act was whether people had a right to purchase health
insurance. Id. at 1709. In reality, though, “the Court’s focus was entirely on the scope of
congressional power and the ability to force states to comply with federal requirements.” Id.
243. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1716.
244. Id. at 1712.
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Court’s opinions are becoming excessively long and unreadable for the
public, exploring these proposals is the least that the Court can do to re-open
the lines of communication.

